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The Infectiousness of Hope 
Joan Woolfrey 
West Chester University of Pennsylvania 
Perhaps not wholly unrelatedly to the message of the first Obama presidential campaign, 
the concept of hope has been receiving increased philosophical attention in recent years.  A good 
bit has been written on honing a definition of hope, and investigating the morally relevant 
territory.  After a brief summary of that literature, I situate myself amongst those who advocate 
for hope—at its best—as a virtue, and I then suggest that hope seems to have a unique status 
amongst the virtues insofar as it appears to be foundational for moral progress. I want to suggest 
that virtue generally can be seen as having an infectious quality, and that along with hope’s 
foundational status, this infectiousness is particularly crucial as regards the development of hope 
for working on solutions to structural injustice.   
 According to both ancient and contemporary sources (e.g., Rosenberg & Hovland), 
cognitive states have three main elements:  affective, conative and cognitive.  As a cognitive 
state, hope has an affective side requiring the presence of the desire for something, a conative 
aspect as hope is always a desire for something (even if we’re talking about generalized hope for 
some vague positive future), and a cognitive aspect insofar as hope is always about estimating 
probabilities (Day, 61). Hope then can be distinguished from belief by the addition of desire and 
a lack of certainty, and from desire by the addition of belief in possibility, however remote. 
 Additionally, hope as a cognitive state can be oriented toward positive outcomes (benefits 
to self and/or others) or towards negative outcomes (harms of various kinds, e.g., financial loss 
for a neighbor or physical violence at a hockey game).  Hope can be future-oriented or relevant 
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to the past if the outcome, although passed, is still uncertain (Fremstedal, 58).  I might be hopeful 
that you got home safely last night given that I have not yet heard from you today. 
 In much of the literature on hope there is a distinction between 1) particular moments of 
hope: hoping for particular objects, events or states of affairs (e.g., Fremstedal, 52) and, 2)  a 
general concept of hope: a sustained state of hopefulness generally (Snow, e.g., 155).  The latter 
distinction may be best understood as a character trait, and when we apply an Aristotelian lens to 
that territory we have the elements necessary for a virtue.  
 The territory of the particular: 
 J.P. Day explores the territory of particular hopes, and points out that hope cannot be 
simply an emotion because it has an evaluative (cognitive) aspect (61).  a) Hope concerns 
probabilities.  In order to hope, I have to have a belief in the possibility of the outcome.  Hope 
has to be for something that is (or is believed to be) attainable.  One cannot hope—as one cannot 
will in the Kantian sense—something that is not (at least theoretically) possible.  However, one 
can hope for things that will not likely occur in one’s lifetime:  say, a world free of terrorism. 
Hope is not appropriately applied to things that are known to be impossible to attain.  This also 
suggests that b) to hope in any substantive sense cannot simply be a matter of a passing wish or 
whimsy. In addition, c) the hoped-for has to be perceived to be at some distance in time from the 
present.  Although it would be possible to assume that the thing is not eminent when it turns out 
to be (“I hope our server comes to take our order soo….oh, hi!”)  d) Hope of the particular has to 
be a hope for something that is or appears to be difficult to attain.  If the thing in question comes 
immediately or as a matter of course then it does not require hope (even though we might use 
that language).   
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 Hope, as elusive, has to also be e) at least perceived to be somewhat (or completely) 
outside of one’s control. If my statement “I hope I do well on that test tomorrow” is more than 
mere belief despite my being well-prepared, it is because I perceive the test as at least something 
of an unknown.  Maybe I am suffering from a bad cold that makes my brain more sluggish than 
usual. If I hope that our society can one day be free from institutional injustice, f) it is not 
something I have to expect to be solely in my power or realized in my lifetime.  Holding to the 
possibility of progress towards the goal would be sufficient, it seems to me, as an appropriate 
realm for hope.  And this raises the relevance of hope in the general sense. 
 The territory of the general: 
 Hope as a sustained cognitive state will be, following Snow, referred to as “hopefulness.” 
It is a state of mind that desires, believes in and anticipates some future goal.  If one possesses 
the general disposition of hopefulness, one possesses an attitude, molded over time, which 
attends to the future with a kind of confidence—with what I will argue is a justified trust that 
“the future one desires” (to use Cheshire Calhoun’s phrase [Calhoun, 10]) will unfold.  It is here 
that the language of virtue ethics seems most useful.  Just as hope for particulars need not, 
hopefulness as a general state need not, be focused on some moral good (however we define 
that). Picture Shakespeare’s Richard III who is “determined to prove a villain” (Richard III, Act 
I, Scene 1).  He can be seen as possessed of a disposition aimed at harm to others. He is hopeful 
that he can bring about those harms. For hopefulness to be designated virtuous, we must be able 
to distinguish Richard III’s character traits from those that contribute to an Aristotelian 
eudemonia  or “human flourishing.” 
 Hopefulness as a virtue 
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 If hopefulness can be conceived of as a character trait, it is easy to imagine it as oriented 
towards a positive or a negative outcome for self or others.  Following Martha Nussbaum, 
virtuous traits are those identifiable as “whatever it is to be stably disposed to act appropriately” 
in a given context (Nussbaum 2000, 441). I hope to make clear that being hopeful is just that in 
what follows. Understanding that hopefulness can be a virtue catches up both a general sense of 
hope and particular instances as they are relevant to ethical behavior.  Nancy Snow refers to this 
relationship of attitude to instance as “architectonic.” As Snow notes, hopefulness as virtue 
“giv[es] rise to more specific hopes as life goes on” (Snow, 155).  If the disposition is virtuous, 
the instances of hope it generates are also going to be morally appropriate. 
 As we know, Aristotle defines a virtue as “a state of character” that involves “both 
actions and emotions” with the goal of seeking “the mean in all things relative to us” 
(Nichomachean Ethics [NE], II.v.1106a10; Eudemian Ethics II.1220a; NE II.vi.1106a30).  A 
character trait worthy of the status of virtue must be one worth developing insofar as it aids in the 
attainment of human flourishing.  I will not attempt a wholesale discussion of eudaimonia here, 
but I do want to argue that hopefulness seems to have a foundational or primary role to play 
amongst the virtues.  In terms of psychological or cognitive states, hopefulness appears to be a 
“deeper dispositional characteristic,” as Gravlee posits, than, for instance, courage, because it 
(hopefulness) motivates or lays the ground for other virtues.  “[H]opefulness is crucial for ethical 
deliberation” (Gravlee, 476-7). I will attempt to unpack this in the next two sections. 
 Important to my discussion, Aristotle also distinguishes between “natural” virtue, and 
virtue “in the strict” or “full” sense (NE VI.xiii.1144b), as Fröding notes (184).  Hopefulness 
may be a natural virtue if one is generally optimistic by temperament or if one’s community 
molds one to develop such a trait and one unreflectively conforms to that molding. Hopefulness 
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as a natural virtue can be seen in the naivety or idealism of youth. To acquire a virtue “in the 
strict sense,” Aristotle points out that we also need to possess practical wisdom (phronesis) 
relevant to that virtue.  That means that in addition to automatically doing the right thing we 
must also have done the work necessary to know it is the right thing to do; to autonomously come 
to understand the value and purpose and appropriateness of the actions we take, even, say, in the 
face of repeated failures or exposure to adversity. Practical wisdom is the understanding that 
comes with deliberation and experience even while it will have, ideally, been nurtured within a 
community that values that kind of work.  Virtues generally are most likely to be perpetuated in a 
community that encourages them and this is what I am calling “infectiousness.”  
 Aristotle understands that the acquisition of practical wisdom comes with long periods of 
training and deliberation within a community of virtuous others (NE VI.vii.1141a15-20).  We 
acquire practical wisdom by being encouraged to notice what things matter in a situation and to 
deliberate about what it means to act appropriately in regard to them. This attention when 
practiced repeatedly creates a heightened awareness and over time instills or reinforces in us the 
habits. But I want to argue that the acquisition of hopefulness as a virtue is of especial 
importance in this process because it creates the possibility—and thus is, in a sense, necessary 
for ethical deliberation in general and for the deliberation that aims to address structural 
injustices specifically.  Thus, I want to suggest that the infectiousness of hope has a kind of 
moral priority. 
 Hopefulness as Necessary 
 For the sake of argument, imagine a hypothetical community where individuals living in 
despair go through the motions of working towards a more just future, habituated into those 
behaviors by the norms of their culture.  Imagine this rote habituation as “natural,” on Aristotle’s 
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view, the possession of an unreflective but ostensibly appropriate habit. The despair signals the 
absence of hope, and this absence removes intention in a vital way—it empties the activity of 
meaning and purpose.  Members of this community may speak of their activity as working 
towards justice because it is a part of the behavior they’ve acquired, but the despair they feel is 
witness to the emptiness of their words. As analogy, if I know that there is no water where I am 
digging I am in a very real sense NOT digging a well; even, if I say that’s what I’m doing.  If I 
know there is zero chance for justice, yet I go through the motions of protesting injustice by 
organized marches or acts of civil disobedience, I am in the same sense as the digging example 
NOT pursuing justice. That there is no way to verify the lack of possibility of attaining justice in 
the way we could verify with scientific measurement and observation the absence of water, does 
not negate the point here if this hypothetical society was one definitively incapable of justice. If 
the possibility does not exist and that information were available, any hope that might 
accompany this context would not be virtuous. Because it is not appropriate to hope for 
something specific in a definitively hopeless situation, one who hopes for that thing is instead 
performing some kind of absurd habituated activity, perhaps akin to a kind of obsessive 
compulsive disorder.  Insofar as appropriateness of an action, emanating from the virtue, requires 
the activity to be linked to the goal of human flourishing, we have no link here because there is 
no possibility of attaining the goal. 
 Hopefulness as virtue in the strict sense requires real reasoned awareness of a) the 
possibility of success, b) the appropriateness of the disposition to the goal, and c) the expectation 
that particular kinds of behaviors and activities “to[wards] the right person, to the right extent, 
and at the right time, for the right reason, and in the right way” (NE II.vi.1106b20) will be 
appropriate for generating that success. If I am to act, inspired by the virtue of hopefulness, I will 
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be acting appropriately when I am automatically choosing behaviors fitted to the successful 
pursuit of the goal. Hopefulness as virtue in the strict sense, insofar as it brings desire and 
possibility together, creating meaningful, self-aware and automatic intention for one’s action 
(that which the above example lacks), is the grounding for working against injustice.  As the 
architectonic of the virtue of hopefulness has it, we have to believe the outcome possible before 
we can meaningfully commit to tasks relevant to bringing that outcome about, as the well water 
example is meant to demonstrate.  A sustained general state of hopefulness will generate the 
various instances of appropriate hope as life goes on. Actions emanating from the virtue of 
hopefulness will be aimed “at the right things, for the right reason,” as virtue “in the strict sense” 
requires.  
 But, what of those hopes that we have for a future so far off or on so complicated a path 
that whatever we are doing in the present will be only remotely related to the change we are 
hoping for? Can we meaningfully apply hopefulness to that circumstance? Are we still talking 
about virtue in that context? What if our hopefulness is related to the elimination of structural 
injustices that any one person can have only the minutest possibility of affecting by themselves? 
I hope for a less racist and sexist and classist and ableist (etc.) world. The possibility of that hope 
being fulfilled is significantly out of my control, although  actions I take towards that end may 
have some miniscule effect. I think the kind of deliberation that hope can inspire in this sort of 
case is perhaps the extreme case of what Luc Bovens calls “frustration tolerance” (Bovens, 681). 
My confidence in my personal ability to bring about this change hovers near zero.  But my 
hopefulness that human beings generally—and collectively—have the potential is significantly 
higher.  Practical wisdom brings my hopefulness into the realm of virtue in the strict sense when 
it shows me that a great many people working together and working contiguously and 
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continuously might, over a great expanse of time, may be able eventually to bring about change.
 Gravlee, in his discussion of what hope leads to, makes a “a distinction between what [he 
calls] speculative (or hopeful) deliberation and proper (or confident) deliberation” (473). When 
hope is for a thing completely out of my control, hope will motivate me to deliberate, not about 
how to bring the thing about, but about what to do once the thing has arrived.  I cannot control 
the weather, but I can control what I will do depending on the weather.  When hope is related to 
something within my control, I have what he calls “optimistic deliberation.”  I have confidence 
in my abilities and believe I have some contribution, and thus control, to make towards the 
outcome (Gravlee, 473).  The deliberation that hope inspires here is about what I should be doing 
to bring about the desired outcome. This is practical wisdom at work.  We are in search of the 
best, most appropriate, route for responding in ways motivated by the virtue.  
 The change hoped for and thus relevant to the actions deliberated about in the case of 
institutional injustices does not fit either of Gravlee’s distinctions well, in my view.  Deliberation 
about institutionalized injustice is not speculative, in that speculative deliberation is not aimed at 
actions I can take to cause the change.  In the case of structural injustices, there are actions I can 
take that are not wholly unrelated to the change hoped for, such as participating in boycotts or 
being one among many peacefully protesting to draw attention to these injustices.  And, it is not 
what Gravlee refers to as the “optimistic” or “proper” kind because it is it not reasonable to 
believe that my individual contributions will have much to do with any eventual change.  A third 
distinction seems useful. Hopefulness about a future that a whole community must work to bring 
about is about generating a collective kind of deliberation. Akin to Seyla Benhabib’s use of the 
term, this sort of deliberation would have to be viewed as a public dialogue about the best 
possible ways forward (Benhabib, 69). The public debate about same-sex marriage in the last 
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decade or so could serve as an example.  My private deliberation about the justness of access to 
same-sex marriage will do nothing by itself. Participating in the public deliberation by raising the 
ethical implications in my classroom over the last decade was encouraged by my knowledge that 
many of my colleagues around the country were having the same conversations, as were public 
figures of various kinds. Change would not have come on this issue without many conversations 
happening in many places.  Legislation would not have occurred without lengthy public 
deliberation beforehand. I pursue the sense of obligation related to such deliberation implied here 
in the next section. 
 Hopefulness as Duty 
 If the claim that hopefulness can be viewed as a virtue is convincing, and if hopefulness 
about the elimination of structural injustices requires the generation of a kind of collective 
deliberation, there seems to be a Catch-22 here. I cannot be hopeful of any particular change that 
I can contribute relevant to structural injustice unless I believe it is possible that others will 
participate.  I must believe others will participate before I can hope that any contribution I 
make—regardless of size—will have any connection to the long term goal of eliminating 
injustice. Each of us individually must arrive at the conclusion that others will participate; that 
the work is worth doing and that others will recognize that fact in order to feel hopeful that our 
actions matter. My hopefulness as a virtue cannot exist without my expectation that it will also 
exist in others. Hopefulness in a futile situation is a vice. If all this follows, I have a basis for 
making my main claim:  that hope (as hopefulness) can be infectious because of its status as 
virtue, and that infectiousness is a moral requirement encouraging the work that, if sustained, 
could lead to the attainment of justice. That is, the spread of hopefulness as virtue is required for 
inspiring the work needed for social change. 
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 Collective responsibility for hope 
 I argue that this hopefulness is the right attitude to possess from two separate directions.  
First of all, borrowing from a theme in applied ethics (business ethics and research ethics 
specifically) of ethical leadership—role modeling—as a moral obligation.  Psychologist James 
Rest summarized, back in 1982, that “[t]he research convincingly demonstrates that modeling 
and reinforcement have impact on social behavior” (Rest, 34). And the research unsurprisingly 
continues to support this claim. Supervisors who model unethical behavior, for instance, will 
have a negative impact on the behavior of their subordinates (e.g., Gelman & Gibelman, cited in 
Mumford and Mumford).  Also, not surprisingly, there is evidence that the reverse is true as well.  
Graduate school, e.g., is where future researchers learn what “constitutes unacceptable deviation 
from shared norms of conduct” (Anderson, et al., 331).  Acquiring the qualities of a good 
researcher is most likely when one is surrounded by ethical, reflective, principled supervisors.  
Aristotle understood this, evident in his approach to molding the young who are not mature 
enough yet to have acquired practical wisdom (e.g., NE II.iii.1104b10). Acquisition of natural 
virtue in the young occurs when encouraged by the virtuous adults around them. 
 The second direction for my examination of the worth of hopefulness comes from Larry 
May. He argues that collectivities are in part identified by a set of “shared interests” (May, 46) 
and if members of these collectivities possess what he calls “risky attitudes”—such as racist 
attitudes known to cause harm—individual members of the group are at least partially 
responsible for the harms emanating from those risky attitudes even if they themselves did not 
directly produce the harm because their presence, as a part of a group, feeds the likelihood of 
harm (May, 48). The climate created by such a group increases the probability that some action 
related to that attitude will result.  I suggest it makes sense to think in these terms for positive 
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attitudes too.  I think May’s view is particularly useful in terms of the attitude of hope because 
hope appears, as I’ve said, to be crucial for ethical deliberation and hopefulness as an attitude 
akin to May’s “risky attitudes” makes that deliberation more likely and thus potentially more 
productive. The cognitive aspect of the virtue of hopefulness involves evaluation of possibility.  
The practical wisdom involved in the elimination of structural injustice is in part a recognition 
that success is not achievable without collective efforts, and it is a part of the ethical deliberation 
necessary in order to assess likely paths forward. Hope for the elimination of structural injustices 
requires spreading the virtue of hopefulness because actual elimination requires collective 
deliberation and collective effort. Identifying possible paths forward is part of that deliberative 
effort, and encouraging the virtue of hopefulness at least in the natural sense will make that work 
more likely. The collective effort may or may not be wholly deliberative, but it is necessary.  
Whether or not all involved possess the virtue of hopefulness in the strict sense is not important; 
the collective effort is. 
 Structural injustice cannot be eliminated simply by a stroke of some benevolent dictator’s 
pen because this type of injustice is deeply embedded in the tissues of a culture and prying it out 
requires a multitude of responses on a multiplicity of levels; e.g., structural injustices tend to 
have effects on individual attitudes and beliefs. Such attitudes require significant personal soul-
searching to identify and eliminate—such as that which a loving but homophobic parent must 
work through when confronted with his or her own prejudices when a child has revealed his or 
her sexual orientation. 
 Virtue in the strict sense requires practical wisdom, and it is best to be in possession of 
virtue in the natural sense in order to develop it in the strict sense, and, the virtue of hopefulness 
in the strict sense seems necessary for further ethical deliberation: not only do we need to 
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evaluate the best paths forward but we also need to deliberate about what other virtues it might 
be appropriate to have for the pursuit of human flourishing. While the former requires Aristotle’s 
phronesis, the latter involves a more general kind of ethical deliberation.  For all of this, we need 
a community surrounding us, encouraging the appropriate dispositions and giving us hope. Such 
hopefulness is akin to instilling us with purpose. If the future one desires is one of eudaimonia, 
then, hopefulness as a virtue is fundamental to that goal, and the community is essential to 
instilling the virtue. I will also suggest—though this seems obvious—that elimination of 
structural injustices is required for the human flourishing of all. 
 In summary, then, if we acquire practical wisdom by being embedded in a community 
that encourages deep reflection on how to act appropriately, it seems that we must begin with the  
acquisition of a general sustained cognitive state containing the belief, desire and expectation 
that acting appropriately is possible.  That virtue too is an offshoot of the community’s 
encouragement.  Developing the virtue of hopefulness is of vital importance to an individual’s 
character, and thus one of the most important things an individual can do, and one of the most 
important things a community can encourage. 
 When we consider the collective side of hopefulness, there is the recognition of a kind of 
attitude of sustained confidence, or “trust” which gets its impetus from the group. Walker notes 
this aspect of human relations generally (e.g., 23-4). This trust involves the recognition that a) 
one is not in this alone, b) one cannot attain one’s goals by oneself, and c) the change one seeks 
is possible because at least some others feel the same way and many others act the same way 
(whether with practical wisdom or not). And it is through that confidence that hopefulness can 
make its greatest contribution.  A hopeful attitude when shared can make a space where good is 
more likely to occur, and as regards structural injustice, that good, I have tried to argue, will not 
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occur without the hopefulness.  At its best, the most important contribution that hopefulness 
makes, as I want to present it, is a tacit acknowledgement that the attitude of hopefulness is 
warranted which in turn encourages others to hold the attitude, making action associated with 
that attitude more likely. This is the infectiousness of hope: a community molds its members. 
The group will have an effect, first, on the likelihood that a natural virtue gets developed, and 
second, that the natural virtue gets transformed into a virtue in the strict sense.  I am encouraged 
to maintain my hopefulness in the face of structural injustice if the group I am associated with is 
also hopeful. The amount of confidence I have in the future can grow correlative to the numbers 
of people who share that confidence. It is of course possible that the disposition being 
encouraged is a false hope, a misplaced hope and thus more like a vice. If collective deliberation 
has done its job well we have some reason to be hopeful(!) that this is not the case. If I’m the 
only one worried about the environmental damage from fracking in Western Pennsylvania or the 
Bakken reserves in North Dakota, I’m going to feel mighty insignificant in the face of the oil 
companies, and state legislators and grateful families who are benefiting from the monetary 
compensation. If there are several hundred of us or a couple thousand of us, it is actually more 
reasonable to expect that environmental concerns related to fracking will be noticed and attended 
to. Successes feed back into a continuation of hopefulness. 
 It has been argued (e.g., Nelsoni) that one aspect of hopefulness may actually have a 
detrimental effect on work that needs to be done.  If we are encouraged to believe that there is 
reason for hope that could be an excuse for not doing the work.  Michael P. Nelson, raises this 
issue specifically as regards attitudes towards climate change (459).  This form of hope, 
however, does not seem to fit into the virtue of hopefulness, if the virtue is “what it is to be 
stably disposed to act appropriately”.  Hope that leads to inaction is not virtuous.  Nelson 
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juxtaposes hope to virtue, as a matter of fact (460), so I do not believe he is talking about the 
worth of hopefulness as a dispositional motivator. The hope he sees would qualify as vice. To 
truly possess the virtue of hopefulness—in the strict sense—requires an emphasis on calm, 
reasonable, sustained deliberation on the appropriate steps towards positive change.  
 Aristotle says we do not study ethics “in order to know what virtue is, but in order to 
become good” (NE II.ii.1103b.25). If “hope matters” because “hoping supports continued efforts 
to bring about the future one desires” (Calhoun, 10), and if the future one desires is justifiable 
based on the goal of “becoming good” or increasing access to human flourishing and institutional 
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